How to Write A Biography For A Crowdfunding Disclosure Document

Improving Legal Documents In Crowdfunding: How to Write A Biography For A Disclosure Document

Investors want to know the people running the show. That’s why we always include a brief biography of the principals in a securities disclosure document, whether a Form C, a Private Placement Memorandum, or an Offering Statement. In Regulation A offerings, for example, companies must:

Note the italicized language:  “What is required is information relating to the level of the employee’s professional competence. . . .” I point that out because to often we see business biographies like this:

Alas, that has nothing to do with Mr. Smith’s professional competence.

Mr. Smith’s biography should look more like this:

That’s much more useful to investors. And it’s much more impressive, isn’t it?

Questions? Let me know.

Markley S. Roderick
Lex Nova Law
10 East Stow Road, Suite 250, Marlton, NJ 08053
P: 856.382.8402 | E: mroderick@lexnovalaw.com

title III crowdfunding outline for portals and issuers

The Crowdfunding Bad Actors Rule: Applying For A Waiver

Reg CF, Rule 506(c), and Regulation A all include what have come to be known as “bad actor” rules, codified in 17 CFR §227.503, 17 CFR §230.506(d), and 17 CFR §230.262. In each case, the rule provides that the company can’t use the exemption in question to raise capital if the company itself or certain people affiliated with the company (directors, officers, etc.) have violated certain securities-related laws.

(The bad actor rules don’t apply to investors!)

In each case, the rule allows a company to apply for a waiver. The waiver provisions are codified in 17 CFR §227.503(b)(2), 17 CFR §230.506(d)(2)(ii), and 17 CFR §230.262(b)(2). Each provides for waiver “Upon a showing of good cause and without prejudice to any other action by the Commission, if the Commission determines that it is not necessary under the circumstances that an exemption be denied.”

The SEC Has Complete Discretion

The SEC has identified some factors it will consider but, in truth, whether it is “necessary under the circumstances that an exemption be denied” is highly ambiguous and therefore highly subjective. As a result, the SEC has enormous discretion whether to grant waivers. Faced with two waiver requests with similar facts, the SEC might reach different conclusions. 

What Factors Matter

With that said, the SEC has identified the following factors, for now:

  • Did the Violation Involve the Sale of Securities?  An individual can become a bad actor without violating securities laws – for example, if a state regulator prohibits her from being associated with savings and loan associations. The SEC might be more inclined to give her a waiver, as compared to a person found guilty of having violated federal securities laws.
  • Did the Violation Involve Bad Intent?  Some violations involve bad intent (in legalese, “scienter”), like the intentional failure to disclose important information to investors. The SEC is less likely to grant waivers in those cases than where the violation was technical and unintentional, like the inadvertent failure to file a report.
  • Who Was Responsible for the Misconduct?  Suppose that while Mr. X was its Managing Partner, Company Y engaged in conduct causing it to become a bad actor, and that Mr. X was responsible. Two years later, Mr. X is no longer with Company Y. The SEC is more likely grant Company Y a waiver than if Mr. X were still at the helm. 
  • Is the Culture of the Company Good or Bad?  Underlining that waiver requests are highly subjective, the SEC believes that, where the bad actor is an entity rather than individual, it should take into account the culture, or “tone at the top,” of the entity. If the C-suite executives are trying to comply, the SEC would be more likely to grant a waiver than if they have obstructed the SEC’s investigations.
  • How Long did the Misconduct Last?  If the misconduct was brief, even an isolated event, the SEC would be more inclined to rule favorably than if it occurred over an extended period.
  • What Remedial Steps Have Been Taken?  The SEC will consider “what remedial measures the party seeking the waiver has taken to address the misconduct, when those remedial measures began, and whether those measures are likely to prevent a recurrence of the misconduct and mitigate the possibility of future violations.” Remedial steps could include (i) improving internal training, (ii) adopting or revising policies and procedures, (iii) improving internal controls, (iv) terminating employees responsible for the misconduct, and (v) completing educational courses. I believe the most effective remedial action, from the SEC’s perspective, would be to hire an outside compliance consultant, take her recommendations seriously, and implement as many as possible. 
  • Will Bad Things Happen if the Waiver is Denied?  The SEC will consider who will be hurt if the waiver is denied, and how badly. For example, suppose Company XYZ has already raised $50 million from 2,700 investors for a real estate development, using Regulation A. It needs to raise $5 million more using Rule 506(b) but has been designated a bad actor. If it is unable to raise the additional capital all the existing investors will lose their money. The SEC would take the potential harm to existing investors into account, along with other factors.

The SEC has also stated that it might develop a longer and more objective list in the future, based on its experience with actual waiver requests.

Waivers Are Not Black and White

The SEC can say No. It can also say Yes, but with conditions. For example, it might require additional disclosure. It might require additional notices to investors. It might limit the scope or term of the offering(s) for which a waiver is requested. In one instance, the SEC granted the waiver provided that (i) the applicant would retain an independent consultant and submit a written report, (ii) the applicant would implement all the consultant’s recommendations or obtain the SEC’s consent to alternatives, and (iii) the initial waiver would last for only 30 months, with the opportunity to request an extension.

You Might Not Need a Waiver

The bad actor rules apply to offerings under Rule 506, Regulation A, and Reg CF (they also apply to offerings under Rule 505, but that’s not Crowdfunding). Rule 506, Regulation A, and Reg CF are exemptions to the general rule, set forth in section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933, that every time you raise money from investors you have to conduct a full-blown IPO. 

But they are not the only exemptions. Section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act still provides an exemption for “transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering.” In the early days of our securities laws, the ambiguity of the italicized language led to an enormous amount of litigation, which in turn led the SEC to create some of the exemptions, or “safe harbors,” used regularly today.

But the language is still there and, despite the ambiguity, there is no doubt that exempt offerings can be conducted without relying on Rule 506, Regulation A, or Reg CF. Consider Company XYZ above, which needs $5 million to complete its real estate development. If Company XYZ knows (has an existing relationship with) five wealthy investors each willing to write a $1 million check, it can forego the waiver request.

How to Apply 

Written requests for waivers should explain in detail (i) how the person came to be treated as a bad actor, (ii) her background in the securities industry and otherwise, and (iii) the nature of the offering(s) for which the waiver is sought. Is it a single real estate syndication under Rule 506? A large fund raising capital using Regulation A? A private equity fund raising capital from only qualified purchasers, i.e., people with more than $5 million of investable assets?

Most importantly, the request should explain why disqualification is not necessary. A request that amounts to “He’s a really great person and promises to do better this time” will be denied. A request should correlate with the factors identified by the SEC and identify any other objective factors showing that what happened in the past has little or no bearing on the new offerings. 

Waiver requests should be sent to:

Sebastian Gomez Abero, Chief
Office of Small Business Policy
Division of Corporation Finance
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
100 F Street, N.E.
Washington, DC 20549-3628

Confidentiality

Requests for waivers become public documents, just like requests for no-action letters. If you want parts of your waiver request to be treated as confidential, you can ask for confidential treatment separately. Be prepared for the SEC to say No, whereupon you will decide whether to withdraw the request.

Questions? Let me know.

Four Becomes Three: Regulation A Offerings Are Easier Now

In this blog post from long ago, I wondered whether a company raising money through Regulation A could legally sell directly to investors. On one hand, the law in a handful of states require all sales to be through broker-dealers. On the other hand, those state laws might be invalid under section 18(b) of the Securities Act of 1933.

It looks as if common sense and the market are answering the question without litigation.

Late last year, Florida changed its laws to allow direct sales. Florida is a big state with lots of investors, so that’s a big deal. What we once referred to as four “problems states” has become three:  Texas, New Jersey, and Washington.

In my humble opinion, the state laws don’t make sense. A Regulation A offering is reviewed by the Securities and Exchange Commission through a process much like a public offering. Under federal law, the SEC review is enough to allow sales to both accredited and non-accredited investors. I cannot see a justification for a state to require more protection in the form of a broker-dealer review; in fact, this reasoning makes me think that section 18(b) should override the state laws.  

The state laws also add a very significant cost to a Regulation A offering. I’m not aware of any broker-dealer willing to sell Regulation A securities only to residents of three states. Instead, broker-dealers charge more than 2% of the whole raise. Broker-dealers need to charge these fees to cover their own costs and risks, obviously. By driving up the costs of the offering, however, the state laws undermine a primary goal of Crowdfunding, i.e., to make great investments available to ordinary Americans.

Off the soapbox now.

Of the three remaining problem states, New Jersey is the easiest. You file a form to register as a “dealer” and you’re done.

Washington is hard. Washington also allows registration as a dealer, but in my experience the designated dealer must be an individual who is also a general partner/manager of the issuer. For liability reasons, that might not be acceptable. If in doubt, don’t sell securities in Washington.

Texas also allows registration as a dealer. While Texas generally requires that the individual registering have FINRA licenses, that requirement can be waived. The process can take a couple months.

My recommendation:  register in New Jersey; register in Texas and ask for a waiver (start that process early); and don’t sell in Washington.

If anyone has more current advice or information I’d love to hear it.

Questions? Let me know.

new risk factors for crowdfunding and beyond

More Noise About Accredited Investors In Crowdfunding

The House of Representatives just passed not one, not two, but three different bills that would expand the definition of “accredited investor.” Does this mean the definition will change? No.

The three proposed changes are:

  • Include in the definition of accredited investor anyone who says he or she understands the risks, using a form of not more than two pages issued by the SEC. This would effectively eliminate the concept of accredited investor.
  • Include in the definition of accredited investor anyone who has received personalized advice from a person who has himself or herself become an accredited investor under 17 CFR §230.501(A)(10), by passing an exam approved by the SEC. The mystery here is why the proposed bill wouldn’t include anyone who has received personalized advice for a registered investment adviser.
  • Allow anyone, including non-accredited investors, to invest in the aggregate up to 10% of their income or net worth in private securities. No time period is provided.

The proposed changes to the definition of accredited investor are part of a larger package of legislation that would ease more than a dozen rules in the federal securities laws, including:

  • Expand the definition of “emerging growth companies.”
  • Create a safe harbor for brokers and finders in private placements.
  • Ease the “independence” rule for auditors.
  • Ease the registration requirements under section 12(g) of the Exchange Act.
  • Expand the definition of venture capital fund for purposes of section 3(c)(1) of the Investment Company Act.
  • Add a new exemption under the Securities Act of 1933 for issuers raising less than $250,000.
  • Double the Regulation A offering limit from $75,000,000 to $150,000,000.

And so on.

This legislation can best be understood by reference to the man who introduced it, Representative McHenry of North Carolina. Representative McHenry was the principal sponsor of the JOBS Act, which created Crowdfunding. Before and since, he has been an advocate for improving access to capital for entrepreneurs and giving ordinary Americans access to opportunities now reserved for the very wealthy.

But Representative McHenry is leaving Congress. He was a close friend of Kevin McCarthy and briefly assumed leadership of the House when McCarthy was deposed. That episode seems to have drained his enthusiasm; he announced his plan to retire shortly afterward.

This legislation should probably be viewed as Representative McHenry’s swan song, his wish list, even his legacy. Unfortunately, and as I’m sure he recognizes, it’s likely that none of it will find its way into law.

Questions? Let me know.

financial statements in crowdfunding

Whose Financial Statements?

Reg CF requires financial statements. To refresh your memory:

Those thresholds are based on the maximum you’re trying to raise. So if your “target amount” is $600,000 but you’re trying to raise up to $900,000, and this is your second Reg CF offering, you need audited statements. 

Now suppose you conducted your business as a sole proprietorship or an LLC until six months ago, when someone in Silicon Valley told you to convert to a C corporation. Your sole proprietorship or your LLC is a “predecessor” of your C corporation within the meaning of 17 CFR §230.405. Hence, under the Reg CF rules, your financial statements should include the results of the sole proprietorship or LLC. Which makes sense, given the purpose of the disclosure rules.

The same is true if your company intends to acquire another company. If you’re raising money to buy TargetCo Inc. then TargetCo Inc. is a “predecessor” of your company for purposes of Reg CF. Hence, you should include the financial statements of TargetCo Inc. Which also makes sense.

Especially for small companies, financial statements represent one of the biggest impediments to Reg CF. The rules around predecessors make the impediment that much higher.

Questions? Let me know.

title III crowdfunding outline for portals and issuers

The Crowdfunding Bad Actor Rules Don’t Apply To Investors

I often see Subscription Agreements asking the investor to promise she’s not a “bad actor.” This is unnecessary. The term “bad actor” comes from three sets of nearly indistinguishable rules:

  • 17 CFR §230.506(d), which applies to Rule 506 offerings;
  • 17 CFR §230.262, which applies to Regulation A offerings; and
  • 17 CFR §227.503, which applies to Reg CF offerings.

In each case, the regulation provides that the issuer can’t use the exemption in question (Rule 506, Regulation A, or Reg CF) if the issuer or certain people affiliated with the issuer have violated certain laws.

Before going further, I note that these aren’t just any laws – they are laws about financial wrongdoing, mostly in the area of securities. Kidnappers are welcome to use Rule 506, for example, while ax murderers may find Regulation A especially useful even while still in prison.

Anyway.

Reg CF’s Rule 503 lists everyone whose bad acts we care about:

  • The issuer;
  • Any predecessor of the issuer;
  • Any affiliated issuer;
  • Any director, officer, general partner or managing member of the issuer;
  • Any beneficial owner of 20 percent or more of the issuer’s outstanding voting equity securities, calculated on the basis of voting power;
  • Any promoter connected with the issuer in any capacity at the time of filing, any offer after filing, or such sale;
  • Any person that has been or will be paid (directly or indirectly) remuneration for solicitation of purchasers in connection with such sale of securities; and
  • Any general partner, director, officer or managing member of any such solicitor.

Nowhere on that list do you see “investor.” The closest we come is “Any beneficial owner of 20 percent or more of the issuer’s outstanding voting equity securities,” but even there the calculation is based on voting power. In a Crowdfunding offering you wouldn’t give an investor 20% of the voting power, for reasons having nothing to do with the bad actor rules. 

So it just doesn’t matter. This is one more thing we can pull out of Subscription Agreements. 

I know some people will say “But we want to know anyway.” To me this is unconvincing. If you don’t ask about kidnapping you don’t need to ask about securities violations.

Questions? Let me know.

The SEC Can Stop Your Regulation A Offering At Any Time

The SEC has two powerful tools to stop your Regulation A offering anytime.

Rule 258

Rule 258 allows the SEC to immediately suspend an offering if

  • The exemption under Regulation A is not available; or
  • Any of the terms, conditions, or requirements of Regulation A have not been complied with; or
  • The offering statement, any sales or solicitation of interest material, or any report filed pursuant to Rule 257 contains any untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading; or
  • The offering involves fraud or other violations of section 17 of the Securities Act of 1933; or
  • Something happened after filing an offering statement that would have made Regulation A unavailable had it occurred before filing; or
  • Anyone specified in Rule 262(a) (the list of potential bad actors) has been indicted for certain crimes; or
  • Proceedings have begun that could cause someone on that list to be a bad actor; or
  • The issuer has failed to cooperate with an investigation.

If the SEC suspends an offering under Rule 258, the issuer can appeal for a hearing – with the SEC – but the suspension remains in effect. In addition, at any time after the hearing, the SEC can make the suspension permanent.

Rule 258 gives the SEC enormous discretion. For example, the SEC may theoretically terminate a Regulation A offering if the issuer fails to file a single report or files late. And while there’s lots of room for good-faith disagreement as to whether an offering statement or advertisement failed to state a material fact, Rule 258 gives the SEC the power to decide.

Don’t worry, you might think, Rule 260 provides that an “insignificant” deviation will not result in the loss of the Regulation A exemption. Think again: Rule 260(c) states, “This provision provides no relief or protection from a proceeding under Rule 258.”

Rule 262(a)(7)

Rule 262(a)(7) is even more dangerous than Rule 258.

Rule 258 allows the SEC to suspend a Regulation A offering if the SEC concludes that something is wrong. Rule 262(a)(7), on the other hand, allows for suspension if the issuer or any of its principals is “the subject of an investigation or proceeding to determine whether a. . . . suspension order should be issued.”

That’s right: Rule 262(a)(7) allows the SEC to suspend an offering merely by investigating whether the offer should be suspended.

Effect on Regulation D

Suppose the SEC suspends a Regulation A offering under either Rule 258 or Rule 262(a)(7). In that case, the issuer is automatically a “bad actor” under Rule 506(d)(1)(vii), meaning it can’t use Regulation D to raise capital, either.

In some ways, it makes sense that the SEC can suspend a Regulation A offering easily because the SEC’s approval was needed in the first place. But not so with Regulation D, and especially not so with a suspension under Rule 262(a)(7). In that case, the issuer is prevented from using Regulation D – an exemption that does not require SEC approval – simply because the SEC is investigating whether it’s done something wrong. That seems. . . .wrong.

Conclusion

As all six readers of this blog know, I think the SEC has done a spectacular job with Crowdfunding. But what the SEC giveth the SEC can taketh away. I hope the SEC will use discretion exercising its substantial power under Rule 258 and Rule 262(a)(7).

List OF Accredited Investors for PPMs

Every Private Placement Memorandum includes a list of accredited investors, summarizing 17 CFR §230.501(a). With the new definitions coming into effect on December 8th, I thought it might be useful to post a summary here.

“An ‘accredited investor’ includes:

  • A natural person who has individual net worth, or joint net worth with the person’s spouse or spousal equivalent, that exceeds $1 million at the time of the purchase, excluding the value of the primary residence of such person;
  • A natural person with income exceeding $200,000 in each of the two most recent years or joint income with a spouse or spousal equivalent exceeding $300,000 for those years and a reasonable expectation of the same income level in the current year;
  • A natural person who holds any of the following licenses from the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA):  a General Securities Representative license (Series 7), a Private Securities Offerings Representative license (Series 82), or a Licensed Investment Adviser Representative license (Series 65);
  • A natural person who is a “knowledgeable employee” of the issuer, if the issuer would be an “investment company” within the meaning of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the “ICA”) but for section 3(c)(1) or section 3(c)(7) of the ICA;
  • An investment adviser registered under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the “Advisers Act”) or the laws of any state;
  • Investment advisers described in section 203(l) (venture capital fund advisers) or section 203(m) (exempt reporting advisers) of the Advisers Act;
  • A trust with assets in excess of $5 million, not formed for the specific purpose of acquiring the securities offered, whose purchase is directed by a sophisticated person;
  • A business in which all the equity owners are accredited investors;
  • An employee benefit plan, within the meaning of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, if a bank, insurance company, or registered investment adviser makes the investment decisions, or if the plan has total assets in excess of $5 million;
  • A bank, insurance company, registered investment company, business development company, small business investment company, or rural business development company;
  • A charitable organization, corporation, limited liability company, or partnership, not formed for the specific purpose of acquiring the securities offered, with total assets exceeding $5 million;
  • A “family office,” as defined in rule 202(a)(11)(G)-1 under the Advisers Act, if the family office (i) has assets under management in excess of $5,000,000, (ii) was not formed for the specific purpose of acquiring the securities offered, and (iii) is directed by a person who has such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that such family office is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment;
  • Any “family client,” as defined in rule 202(a)(11)(G)-1 under the Advisers Act, of a family office meeting the requirements above, whose investment in the issuer is directed by such family office;
  • Entities, including Indian tribes, governmental bodies, funds, and entities organized under the laws of foreign countries, that were not formed to invest in the securities offered and own investment assets in excess of $5 million; or
  • A director, executive officer, or general partner of the company selling the securities, or any director, executive officer, or general partner of a general partner of that issuer.”

This list doesn’t try to capture every detail of every definition. For purposes of a disclosure document it’s plenty.

Why Everyone Benefits from the SEC’s New Crowdfunding Rules

To the delight of both issuers and investors, the SEC continues to make crowdfunding better as they have announced major changes to their crowdfunding rules. In this podcast, crowdfunding attorney Mark Roderick and Co-Founder of Lex Nova Law goes over what he believes are the most important and impactful changes including raising the limits for Regulation A and Regulation CF deals as well as the ability of “finders” to legally accept commissions for bringing deals to the table. And perhaps most importantly, the changes regarding accredited and non-accredited investors are a complete game changer! In this podcast, you’ll find out why that is.

Listen to “Why Everyone Benefits from the SEC's New Crowdfunding Rules” on Spreaker.

We can’t elect a President, but there’s certainly a preponderance of positive energy being circulated in the crowdfunding industry with respect to these rules revisions from the SEC! By increasing the raise limit of Reg.A and Reg.CF offerings, the entire process has become much more realistic in terms of making everything successful on just about every level and aspect of the industry. Now, accredited investors can have whatever stake of a project they want, and non-accredited investors can participate in ways unimaginable just a short time ago. And what’s an accredited investor? That rule has changed too!

One of the biggest changes the SEC has implemented is the legality of “finders” receiving commissions or payments for brokering deals and introducing investors to issuers, syndicators, developers, etc. Before this change, only broker-dealers were allowed to receive compensation for such deals. With the new changes, these finders can now legally receive these commissions and other transaction-based compensation from issuers. The ability to legally monetize your connections is something many have been waiting for for quite a long time!

There’s no question that crowdfunding still has its growing pains. However, one thing’s for sure: finders, investors, and issuers alike should all be jumping for joy after listening to the information Mr. Roderick goes over in this podcast. Broker-dealers, maybe not… But regardless, it’s a new world for crowdfunding and doors continue to open. The industry is definitely heading in the right direction.

Beneficiary Designations by Crowdfunding Issuers and Portals

Some Crowdfunding portals and issuers allow investors to designate a beneficiary, i.e., a person who will take ownership of the security (the LLC interest, debt instrument, whatever) should the investor die. Just be careful.

Most states (not Texas) allow the owners of securities, including privately-held securities, to designate a beneficiary outside the owner’s will, under a version of the Uniform TOD (Transfer on Death) Security Registration Act (the Delaware version is 12 DE Code §801 et seq). For the investor, the advantage of designating a beneficiary is that the security doesn’t go through the probate process but instead passes directly to the designated beneficiary.

For the Crowdfunding issuer or portal, there is a benefit to making life easier for investors. And it’s pretty straightforward to create a beneficiary designation form on your website.

Nevertheless, adding convenience for investors carries some risks. For example:

  • Suppose an investor wants to designate her cousin Jacob as the beneficiary of her LLC interest. She uses Jacob’s name on the beneficiary designation form but mistakenly uses her husband’s social security number, out of habit. What happens?
  • The investor correctly designates Jacob on the form but later changes her mind and designates her husband as the beneficiary of the LLC interest in her will. Unfortunately for her husband, the beneficiary designation made using your form cannot be undone by the will. Your form didn’t make that clear.
  • The investor properly designates Jacob as the beneficiary of her LLC interest and doesn’t change her mind, but she lives in a community property state and your form didn’t tell her she needed her husband’s consent.
  • The investor properly designates Jacob as the beneficiary of her LLC interest but he dies before she does, and she hasn’t designated a successor beneficiary.
  • Your site crashes and the investor’s beneficiary designation is lost.

What’s your budget for legal fees this year?

Designating a beneficiary on your site isn’t the investor’s only option. She can sign a simple will or codicil (if she already has a will) designating a beneficiary for her LLC interest and any other securities or other property, which probably makes more sense than designating beneficiaries security-by-security. And if her cousin and husband end up arguing over the codicil, you’re not involved.

If you’d like a sample of a Beneficiary Designation Form let me know.