The Crowdfunding Bad Actor Rules Don’t Apply To Investors

I often see Subscription Agreements asking the investor to promise she’s not a “bad actor.” This is unnecessary. The term “bad actor” comes from three sets of nearly indistinguishable rules:

  • 17 CFR §230.506(d), which applies to Rule 506 offerings;
  • 17 CFR §230.262, which applies to Regulation A offerings; and
  • 17 CFR §227.503, which applies to Reg CF offerings.

In each case, the regulation provides that the issuer can’t use the exemption in question (Rule 506, Regulation A, or Reg CF) if the issuer or certain people affiliated with the issuer have violated certain laws.

Before going further, I note that these aren’t just any laws – they are laws about financial wrongdoing, mostly in the area of securities. Kidnappers are welcome to use Rule 506, for example, while ax murderers may find Regulation A especially useful even while still in prison.

Anyway.

Reg CF’s Rule 503 lists everyone whose bad acts we care about:

  • The issuer;
  • Any predecessor of the issuer;
  • Any affiliated issuer;
  • Any director, officer, general partner or managing member of the issuer;
  • Any beneficial owner of 20 percent or more of the issuer’s outstanding voting equity securities, calculated on the basis of voting power;
  • Any promoter connected with the issuer in any capacity at the time of filing, any offer after filing, or such sale;
  • Any person that has been or will be paid (directly or indirectly) remuneration for solicitation of purchasers in connection with such sale of securities; and
  • Any general partner, director, officer or managing member of any such solicitor.

Nowhere on that list do you see “investor.” The closest we come is “Any beneficial owner of 20 percent or more of the issuer’s outstanding voting equity securities,” but even there the calculation is based on voting power. In a Crowdfunding offering you wouldn’t give an investor 20% of the voting power, for reasons having nothing to do with the bad actor rules. 

So it just doesn’t matter. This is one more thing we can pull out of Subscription Agreements. 

I know some people will say “But we want to know anyway.” To me this is unconvincing. If you don’t ask about kidnapping you don’t need to ask about securities violations.

Questions? Let me know.

Crowdfunding Real Estate

PODCAST: The Storage Investor Show

Real Estate Crowdfunding in 2021 with Mark Roderick – episode 9

In This Episode:

  • Updates to Accredited Investor qualifications
  • Who qualifies as a “Finder” of capital?
  • Title III crowdfunding changes
  • How can sponsors and investors take advantage of recent changes
  • Why crowdfunding is a marketing business

Guest Info:

Mr. Roderick concentrates his practice on the representation of privately-owned and emerging growth companies, including companies in the technology, real estate, and health care industries. Mark specializes in the representation of entrepreneurial, growth-oriented companies and their owners.

The Expanded Definition Of Accredited Investor: A (First) Step In The Right Direction

For all the ink spilled wondering and worrying how the SEC might change the definition of accredited investor, yesterday’s announcement seems almost anti-climactic.

Perhaps the main story is what the SEC didn’t do. It didn’t limit the definition of accredited investor in any way. Everyone who was an accredited investor yesterday is an accredited investor today. In that sense the SEC continues to demonstrate its support for the private investment marketplace and give the lie to those who believe otherwise.

On the other hand, the SEC didn’t break much new ground expanding the definition, at least for now.

The principal expansion, as expected, was in adding to the list of accredited investors individuals who hold Series 7, Series 65, or Series 82 licenses. The SEC also added investment advisers registered with the SEC or any state and, more surprisingly, venture capital fund advisers and exempt reporting advisers. I say “more surprisingly” because neither venture capital fund advisers nor exempt reporting advisers are required to pass exams or otherwise demonstrate financial knowledge or sophistication.

The list of accredited investors was also extended to include:

  • Entities, including Indian tribes, governmental bodies, funds, and entities organized under the laws of foreign countries, that (1) own “investments” (as defined in Rule 2a51-1(b) under the Investment Company Act of 1940) in excess of $5 million, and (2) were not formed to invest in the securities offered;
  • Rural business development companies;
  • Family offices with at least $5 million in assets under management and their family clients, as each term is defined under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940; and
  • Knowledgeable employees of a private fund, but only with respect to investments in that fund.

Finally, the SEC clarified that existing provisions of the accredited investor definition that refer to spouses also includes “spousal equivalents,” meaning someone who has gotten under your nerves for at least seven years (actually “a cohabitant occupying a relationship generally equivalent to that of a spouse”).

While a modest first step, these additions are welcome and a harbinger of bigger things to come. The new rule explicitly invites FINRA, other industry self-regulatory authorities, and accredited education institutions to develop “certifications, designations, or credentials” that the SEC would approve for accredited investor qualification. I imagine FINRA and professional organizations will jump at the chance. If this leads to millions or tens of millions of Americans learning about securities and participating in the Crowdfunding market, well, that’s a very good thing for everyone.

The new definition will become effective 60 days after being published in the Federal Register.

Questions? Let me know.

My Comments To The SEC’s Crowdfunding Proposals

Gentlemen and Ladies—

The following are comments to the proposed rules published in the Federal Register on March 31, 2020 relating to offerings under §4(a)(6) of the Securities Act of 1933 and related matters.

Before commenting, I would like to applaud the Commission not only for these proposals but for its approach to the JOBS Act generally. I have practiced in this space extensively since 2012, representing funding portals, issuers, and other industry participants. Time after time I have been impressed with how the Commission has sought to achieve two complimentary goals:  on one hand, protecting investors and ensuring that American capital markets remain the most transparent and robust in the world; and on the other hand, facilitating capital formation by small, job-creating enterprises and giving ordinary Americans the opportunity to invest in businesses historically available only to the wealthy.

Among many examples I will mention just one. On May 4, 2020 the Commission adopted temporary rules to facilitate capital formation under §4(a)(6) In response to the COVID-19 pandemic. No one knows how many jobs the temporary rules will save or create, but the willingness of the Commission to draft and issue the temporary rules in the midst of a crisis, taking the time to help very small businesses while overseeing a complex, multi-trillion dollar securities market, speaks volumes. The Commission clearly believes that Crowdfunding has an important role to play in our capital markets, and all Americans, not just those of us in the industry, should be grateful.

Speaking from the ground floor, so to speak, I have just a few comments, all geared toward making the industry more robust while protecting investors.

Raised Offering Limit and Elimination of Limit for Accredited Investors

To my mind, the two most important and welcome proposals are (i) to increase the limit set forth in 17 CFR §227.100(a)(1) from $1,070,000 to $5,000,000, and (ii) to eliminate the limit in 17 CFR §227.100(a)(2) for accredited investors. Either change would have been welcome, but together I believe they will change the Title III market significantly for the better, improving both the quality of the offerings and the level of compliance.

With offerings limited to $1,070,000 and very low per-investor limits, even for accredited investors, funding portals have had a very hard time making money, plain and simple. Struggling to make ends meet, they lack resources to spend on compliance or on other business practices that would attract more promising issuers and, especially, a larger number of prospective investors. In fact, the difficulty in turning a profit has led some funding portals to adopt practices that may provide some benefit in the short term but drive away rather than attract issuers and investors.

With larger offerings and unlimited investments from accredited investors, I believe that the proposed changes to 17 CFR §227.100(a)(1) and 17 CFR §227.100(a)(2) will reverse that cycle. A profitable funding portal can hire compliance officers, exercise more discretion in the presentation of disclosure materials, provide better documents, insist on quality in all aspects of its business. These steps will in turn attract more investors, which will attract more and better issuers, in a virtuous cycle. With the promise of potential profits, I expect the number, sophistication, and expertise of funding portals to grow rapidly, helping to deliver on the promises with which Title III was launched.

Hence, I strongly support these proposals.

Artificially Low Target Offering Amounts

Too often, we see Title III issuers launch offerings with an artificially low target offering amount, typically $10,000. I believe the artificially-low target amounts are unfair to investors and poisonous to the Title III Crowdfunding market.

The concept of offering “minimums” has always been part of private investments with sophisticated investors. For example, a company seeking to raise as much as $750,000 to obtain three patents and hire a Chief Operating Officer and Chief Marketing Officer might set a minimum offering amount of $450,000, which would allow it to at least obtain two patents and hire the COO. But if the company could raise only $150,000 the company was obligated to give the money back, because sophisticated understand that anything less than $450,000 wouldn’t move the needle for the business.

I believe the concept of target offering amounts in Title III should follow that model, i.e., that the target offering amount should represent an amount of money that would allow the issuer to achieve a significant business goal.

Too often we see on funding portals a company that seeks to raise, say, $350,000 setting a target offering amount as low as $10,000. The artificially low target amount serves the short-term interests of the funding portal and the issuer:  if the company raises, say, $38,000, the issuer receives some cash while the funding portal receives a commission on $38,000 and includes the issuer in its list of “successful” offerings, skewing its statistics as well as the statistics of the industry as a whole. Meanwhile, investors have put $38,000 into a company that needed a lot more and have thereby made an investment fundamentally different and riskier than the investment promised. In the larger picture, I believe sophisticated investors see the game and stay away from the funding portal – and perhaps all of Title III – altogether.

I believe the Commission should amend 17 CFR §227.201(g) to provide as follows:

The target offering amount, the deadline to reach the target offering amount, a statement of the significant business goal the issuer expects to achieve if it can raise the target amount or, if there is no such significant goal, a statement to that effect, and a statement that if the sum of the investment commitments does not equal or exceed the target offering amount at the offering deadline, no securities will be sold in the offering, investment commitments will be cancelled and committed funds will be returned;

In addition, I believe the Commission should caution issuers and funding portals that if raising the target offering amount will not allow the issuer to achieve any significant business goal, a risk factor should be added to that effect.

Revenue-Sharing Notes

The Commission proposes to add 17 CFR §227.100(b)(7), making Title III Crowdfunding unavailable for securities that “Are not equity securities, debt securities, and securities convertible or exchangeable to equity interests, including any guarantees of such securities.”

It is unclear to me whether this new rule would allow securities commonly referred to as “revenue-sharing notes.” I believe these securities should be allowed.

A typical revenue-sharing note has the following features:

  • Investors are entitled to receive a specified percentage of the issuer’s gross revenues, or gross revenues from specified sources (e.g., from sales of a new product).
  • The note specifies a maximum amount investors may receive, often a multiple of the amount invested. For example, investors might be entitled to receive a maximum of twice the amount invested.
  • The note also specifies a maturity date – for example, three years from the date of issue.
  • Payments continue until the sooner of the maturity date or the date investors have received the specified maximum amount.
  • If investors have not received the specified maximum amount by the maturity date, they are entitled to receive the balance (the difference between the maximum amount and the amount they have received to date) on the maturity date.
  • Sometimes, but not always, the revenue-sharing is convertible into equity.

Revenue-sharing notes are especially attractive for small companies and less-experienced investors:

  • They are extremely easy to understand. For less-experienced investors a revenue-sharing note is much easier to understand than a share of common stock, for example.
  • The payments on a revenue-sharing note depend on only one thing:  sales. They do not depend on any expense items. For example, they do not depend on how much compensation is paid to the principals of the company. As a result, the potential for misunderstandings and disputes is reduced substantially.
  • They provide investors with built-in liquidity.
  • They allow issuers to maintain a “cleaner” cap table, possibly facilitating future financing rounds.
  • All those benefits are also available with straight debt securities. For many small businesses, however, and especially for true startups, there is no interest rate – short of usury, that is – that would compensate investors adequately for the risk. As of this morning, the one-year return of the S&P 500 BB High Yield Corporate Bond Index is almost 9%. To compensate investors adequately for the risk of investing in a startup the potential return must be far higher. The revenue-sharing note provides that potential.

Revenue-sharing notes shares features of equity securities in the sense of providing a significant potential for profit, and also share features of debt securities in the sense of providing a date certain for payment. Sharing features of both equity securities and debt securities, it is hard to say a revenue-sharing note is only an equity security or only a debt security. Hence, it would be helpful if the Commission would clarify that revenue-sharing notes may be offered and sold under §4(a)(6).

Accountant Review

In the context of large companies, reviews and audits of financial information by independent accountants is an unmitigated positive, indeed a cornerstone of transparency and integrity in the American capital markets. In the context of very small companies, however, the positives are less apparent and can be outweighed by the cost.

Currently, 17 CFR §227.201(t)(2) requires companies seeking to raise between $107,000 and $535,000 to provide financial statements reviewed by an independent accountant. The cost of such a review varies by region but can certainly amount to between $5,000 and $10,000. For a company seeking to raise, say, $150,000, the cost of the accountant review by itself represents between 3% and 7% of the capital raise, an enormous cost and far more as a percentage than the audit costs of large issuers.

In my opinion, the cost of these reviews is not justified by the value of the additional information they provide to investors. For companies raising no more than $107,000, 17 CFR §227.201(t)(2) requires only information from the company’s Federal tax certified by the principal executive officer, who is typically the founder of the company. My experience in representing hundreds of small companies over more than 30 years suggests that a certification for which a CEO and/or founder takes personal responsibility is much more likely to be accurate than a reviewed financial statement. Although I am confident that every small company files tax returns that are accurate in every respect, out of patriotic obligation, I also note that CEOs and founders are, if anything, incentivized to understate a company’s income on a tax return.

In short, I believe investors get very little, if anything, in terms of the accuracy of a company’s financial disclosures in exchange for the added cost to the company. To bring the cost and the benefit closer into line, I recommend raising the threshold in 17 CFR §227.201(t)(2) to at least $350,000, and possibly eliminating 17 CFR §227.201(t)(2) altogether and raising the threshold in 17 CFR §227.201(t)(1) to $500,000.

I will make two further points in this regard:

  • It is possible that as the market becomes more robust investors will reward companies that provide reviewed financial statements and punish those who don’t. If so, the market will impose its own discipline.
  • Although financial statements are extremely important in evaluating established companies, they are far less important in evaluating small companies and startups. For example, the financial statements of Facebook and Amazon and Microsoft were essentially irrelevant to the earliest investors. I believe that investors in the Title III market make investment decisions almost wholly without regard to historical financial statements and will continue to do so. In this sense the paradigm for large companies simply doesn’t fit the small company market.

Advertising

Section 4A(b)(2) of the Securities Act provides that issuers relying on the exemption of §4(a)(6) “shall not advertise the terms of the offering, except for notices which direct investors to the funding portal or broker.” That rule is implemented in 17 CFR §227.204, which defines the “terms of the offering” to mean (i) the amount of securities offered, (ii) the nature of the securities, (iii) the price of the securities, and (iv) the closing date of the offering period.

In practice this rule has created a great deal of confusion and many inadvertent violations. It has also kept issuers from communicating effectively with prospective investors. I do not believe it has protected investors in any meaningful way.

A small company will reasonably wonder why it is allowed to say “We’re raising capital!” on its Facebook page but might not be allowed to say “We’re trying to raise $250,000 of capital!” I say “might not” because even with this simple example the rule is not clear. If “We’re trying to raise $250,000 of capital!” were the only item the company ever posted on Facebook, that would be okay. But of course the company’s Facebook page is filled with all sorts of other information, including information about the company’s founders and history and products – that’s the point of having a Facebook page. In this situation the statement “We’re trying to raise $250,000 of capital!” might be illegal, while the statement “We’re raising capital!” is fine.

In today’s digital, social-media-driven world that creates a mess, impossible for small companies to untangle.

The problems arise from applying the paradigm of large, public companies to the world of small companies and startups. If I want to buy stock of Google I don’t call Google, I call my broker. At some point in the future funding portals might play the role for small companies that brokers play for large companies today. For the present, however, the reality is that Title III issuers have primary and sometimes exclusive responsibility for marketing their own offerings. To hamstring advertising by Title III issuers is to hamstring Title III.

I do understand and support the goal of directing investors back to the portal and thus ensuring that all investors receive exactly the same information. However, I believe that goal can be accomplished, with no harm to investors, through a slightly different approach.

In a Title III offering, I understand the “terms of the offering” to mean all the information contained in Form C. Thus, I would interpret section 4A(b)(2) to mean only that if an issuer provides to prospective investors all or substantially all of the information provided in its Form C, it must direct them to the portal. Otherwise, issuers should be allowed to advertise their offerings, including the four terms enumerated in current 17 CFR §227.204, with three caveats:

  • I would require every advertisement, no matter its contents, to direct potential investors to the funding portal. For these purposes I would define the term “advertisement” very broadly, even more broadly than the term “offer” is defined under current law. Thus, I would consider requiring even notices permitted by 17 CFR §230.169 to include a link back to the funding portal, if made while the offering is open.
  • I would prohibit any advertisement containing information that is not in the issuer’s Form C.
  • In the text of 17 CFR §227.204 I would remind issuers and their principals of their potential liability for material misstatements and omissions.

Those changes would provide clear rules for issuers and funding portals and, I believe, would unleash a torrent of creativity and energy in the Title III market, with no harm to investors.

The Role of FINRA

Under section 4A(a)(2) of the Securities Act, every funding portal must register with any applicable self-regulatory organization. Because there is only one such organization in the United States, all funding portals must become members of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, or FINRA. Consequently, although not directly germane to the Commission’s proposals published on March 31, 2020, any discussion of Title III must include at least a reference to FINRA and its regulation of funding portals.

Like everyone else involved in Title III, lawyers and the Commission included, FINRA was starting from scratch in 2016, its two point of reference being the Commission’s regulations on one hand and its own experience regulating broker-dealers on the other hand. In my view FINRA has leaned too heavily on its institutional experience regulating large broker-dealers without taking into account the unique aspects of Title III Crowdfunding.

The Commission’s proposals, and my comments to the proposals, are focused on the economic realities of raising capital for very small companies. One of those economic realities is that most funding portals, like most startups, are owned and operated by just a few people. Too often, the FINRA regulatory paradigm seems to ignore this reality and assume that the funding portal is a much larger enterprise, an enterprise with multiple layers of management – an enterprise like a national broker-dealer.

For example, FINRA requires funding portals to adopt and adhere to an extensive manual of policies and procedures addressing every aspect of its operations. Theoretically such a manual is unobjectionable, and in a large organization absolutely necessary, but in the real world of funding portals the manual typically has the effect of requiring Ms. Smith to supervise herself and maintain a meticulous log proving she did so, and how.

Just as the Commission itself seeks to regulate Title III Crowdfunding based on economic realities, understanding that the rules applicable to public filers might not always apply to very small issuers, I would like to see the Commission encourage FINRA to review its approach to funding portals.

****

Thank you for your consideration.

Questions? Let me know.

SEC Proposes Major Upgrades To Crowdfunding Rules

The SEC just proposed major changes to every kind of online offering:  Rule 504, Rule 506(b), Rule 506(c), Regulation A, and Regulation CF.

The proposals and the reasoning behind them take up 351 pages. An SEC summary is here, while the full text is here. The proposals are likely to become effective in more or less their existing form after a 60-day comment period.

I’ll touch on only a few highlights:

  • No Limits in Title III for Accredited Investors:  In what I believe is the most significant change, there will no longer be any limits on how much an accredited investor can invest in a Regulation CF offering. This change eliminates the need for side-by-side offerings and allows the funding portal to earn commissions on the accredited investor piece. The proposals also change the investment limits for non-accredited investor from a “lesser of net worth or income” standard to a “greater of net worth or income” standard, but that’s much less significant, in my opinion.
  • Title III Limit Raised to $5M:  Today the limit is $1.07M per year; it will soon be $5M per year, opening the door to larger small companies.

NOTE:  Those two changes, taken together, mean that funding portals can make more money. The impact on the Crowdfunding industry could be profound, leading to greater compliance, sounder business practices, and fewer gimmicks (e.g., $10,000 minimums).

  • No Verification for Subsequent Rule 506(c) Offerings:  In what could have been a very important change but apparently isn’t, if an issuer has verified that Investor Smith is accredited in a Rule 506(c) offering and conducts a second (and third, and so on) Rule 506(c) offering, the issuer does not have to re-verify that Investor Smith is accredited, as long as Investor Smith self-certifies. But apparently the proposal applies only to the same issuer, not to an affiliate of the issuer. Thus, if Investor Smith invested in real estate offering #1, she must still be verified for real estate offering #2, even if the two offerings are by the same sponsor.
  • Regulation A Limit Raised to $75M:  Today the limit is $50M per year; it will soon be $75M per year. The effect of this change will be to make Regulation A more useful for smaller large companies.
  • Allow Testing the Waters for Regulation CF:  Today, a company thinking about Title III can’t advertise the offering until it’s live on a funding portal. Under the new rules, the company will be able to “test the waters” like a Regulation A issuer.

NOTE:  Taken as a whole, the proposals narrow the gap between Rule 506(c) and Title III. Look for (i) Title III funding portals to broaden their marketing efforts to include issuers who were otherwise considering only Rule 506(c), and (ii) websites that were previously focused only on Rule 506(c) to consider becoming funding portals, allowing them to legally receive commissions on transactions up to $5M.

  • Allow SPVs for Regulation CF:  Today, you can’t form a special-purpose-vehicle to invest using Title III. Under the SEC proposals, you can.

NOTE:  Oddly, this means you can use SPVs in a Title III offering, but not in a Title II offering (Rule 506(c)) or Title IV offering (Regulation A) where there are more than 100 investors.

  • Financial Information in Rule 506(b):  The proposal relaxes the information that must be provided to non-accredited investors in a Rule 506(b) offering. Thus, if the offering is for no more than $20M one set of information will be required, while if it is for more than $20 another (more extensive) set of information will be required.
  • No More SAFEs in Regulation CF:  Nope.

NOTE:  The rules says the securities must be “. . . . equity securities, debt securities, or securities convertible or exchangeable to equity interests. . . .” A perceptive readers asks “What about revenue-sharing notes?” Right now I don’t know, but I’m sure this will be asked and addressed during the comment period.

  • Demo Days:  Provided they are conducted by certain groups and in certain ways, so-called “demo days” would not be considered “general solicitation.”
  • Integration Rules:  Securities lawyers worry whether two offerings will be “integrated” and treated as one, thereby spoiling both. The SEC’s proposals relax those rules.

These proposals are great for the Crowdfunding industry and for American capitalism. They’re not about Wall Street. They’re about small companies and ordinary American investors, where jobs and ideas come from.

No, the proposals don’t fix every problem. Compliance for Title III issuers is still way too hard, for example. But the SEC deserves (another) round of applause.

Please reach out if you’d like to discuss.

Married Couples As Accredited Investors

When a married couple invests in an offering under Rule 506(b), Rule 506(c), or Tier 2 of Regulation A, we have to decide whether the couple is “accredited” within the meaning of 17 CFR §501(a). How can we conclude that a married couple is accredited?

A human being can be an accredited investor in only four ways:

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  • Method #1: If her net worth exceeds $1,000,000 (without taking into account her principal residence); or
  • Method #2: If her net worth with her spouse exceeds $1,000,000 (without taking into account their principal residence); or
  • Method #3: Her income exceeded $200,000 in each of the two most recent years and she has a reasonable expectation that her income will exceed $200,000 in the current year;
  • Method #4: Her joint income with her spouse exceeded $300,000 in each of the two most recent years and she has a reasonable expectation that their joint income will exceed $300,000 in the current year.

A few examples:

EXAMPLE 1: Husband’s net worth is $1,050,001 without a principal residence. Wife’s has a negative net worth of $50,000 (credit cards!). Their joint annual income is $150,000. Husband is accredited under Method #1 or Method #2. Wife is accredited under Method #2.

EXAMPLE 2: Husband’s net worth is $1,050,001 without a principal residence. Wife’s has a negative net worth of $500,000 (student loans!). Their joint annual income is $150,000. Husband is accredited under Method #1. Wife is not accredited.

EXAMPLE 3: Husband’s net worth is $850,000 and his income is $25,000. Wife’s has a negative net worth of $500,000 and income of $250,000. Husband is not accredited. Wife is accredited under Method #3.

Now, suppose Husband and Wife want to invest jointly in an offering under Rule 506(c), where all investors must be accredited.

They are allowed to invest jointly in Example 1, because both Husband and Wife are accredited. They are not allowed to invest jointly in Example 2 because Wife is not accredited, and they are not allowed to invest jointly in Example 3 because Husband is not accredited.

The point is that Husband and Wife may invest jointly only where both Husband and Wife are accredited individually. At the beginning, I asked “How can we conclude that a married couple is accredited?” The answer: There is no such thing as a married couple being accredited. Only individuals are accredited.

CAUTION: Suppose you are an issuer conducting a Rule 506(c) offering, relying on verification letters from accountants or other third parties. If a married couple wants to invest jointly, you should not rely on a letter saying the couple is accredited. Instead, the letter should say that Husband and Wife are both accredited individually.

Questions? Let me know.

Simple Wholesaling Podcast: Raising Money Online for Your Deals & More

CLICK HERE TO LISTEN

Mark Roderick appeared on the Simple Wholesaling Podcast to talk about crowdfunding and the laws and logistics of raising money online.

In this episode, Mark discusses:

  • Mark’s story
  • Raising capital online
  • Businesses that have been very successful
  • How entrepreneurs and the consumers are protected online
  • Portals he recommends
  • Where people should start if they’re interested to try crowdfunding
  • The “don’ts” when trying to raise money on the Internet
  • What accredited investor means
  • The types of returns entrepreneurs pay out to their crowd investors
  • The effects on the stock market when we have many options to invest in different things

Trusts as Accredited Investors in Crowdfunding and Token Sales

Trusts as Accredited Investors in Crowdfunding and Token Sales Example NewCo, LLC is conducting an offering under Rule 506(c) and receives a subscription from the Smith Family Trust. The Trust could be an accredited investor under any of four rules.

Rules for All Trusts

Rule #1: The Trust is an accredited investor if the trustee or co-trustee is a bank, insurance company, registered investment company, business development company, or small business investment company.

Rule #2: Alternatively, the Trust is an accredited investor if:

  • It has more than $5,000,000 in assets;
  • It was not formed for the purpose of investing in NewCo; and
  • Its trustee has such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that he or she is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of a prospective investment.

Rule for Revocable Trusts

Rule #3: If the Trust is a revocable trust, it is an accredited investor if:

  • Mary Smith, the grantor, is herself an accredited investor;
  • The Trust may be amended or revoked at any time by Ms. Smith; and
  • The tax benefits of investments made by the trust pass through to Ms. Smith.

Rule for Irrevocable Trusts

Rule #4: If the Trust is an irrevocable trust, it is an accredited investor if:

  • Mary Smith, the grantor, is herself an accredited investor;
  • The trust is a grantor trust for Federal income tax purposes and Ms. Smith is the sole funding source;
  • Ms. Smith would be taxed on all income of the trust and would be taxed on the sale of trust assets;
  • Ms. Smith is the trustee with sole investment discretion;
  • The entire amount of Ms. Smith’s contribution plus a rate of return would be paid to the grantor prior to any other payments;
  • The Trust was established by Ms. Smith for estate planning purposes; and
  • Creditors of Ms. Smith would be able to reach her interest in the Trust.

Simple, right?

Questions? Let me know.

 

SEC Subcommittee Reports On Accredited Investor Definition

The Dodd-Frank Act instructs the SEC to evaluate the definition of “accredited investor” and, if it sees fit, to modify the definition “as the Commission may deem appropriate for the protection of investors, in the public interest, and in light of the economy.”

As regular readers of this blog know, I’ve been optimistic that the SEC would not take this opportunity to kill Title II Crowdfunding and every other kind of Rule 506(c) private placement (which includes most angel investing as well) by creating an onerous new definition. The report issued recently by a SEC subcommittee, while surprising in some respects, doesn’t dent my optimism.

The subcommittee report makes two important, though obvious, points:

  • The Committee does not believe that the current definition as it pertains to natural persons effectively serves this function in all instances.
  • The current definition’s financial thresholds serve as an imperfect proxy for sophistication, access to information, and ability to withstand losses.

The existing definition is imperfect, yes. The question is, what to do about it?

Although the report does not provide a clear answer to that question, the good news, from my perspective, is that the report does not suggest merely indexing the current thresholds ($200,000 of income, $1 million of net worth) to inflation, which would disqualify most accredited investors and send the private placement market into a tailspin. Instead, the report seeks a standard that will address both financial sophistication and the ability to withstand loss.

The report suggests two specific measures of financial sophistication: the series 7 securities license and the Chartered Financial Analyst designation. Following the lead of the United Kingdom, the report also suggests that those with proven investment experience – for example, a member of an angel investing group – might qualify. Finally, the report suggests, as others have before, that the SEC could develop an examination for the purpose of qualifying investors.

Declining a suggestion from several quarters, the report does not include lawyers or accountants as investors who should be deemed to have financial sophistication.

The reports veers a little off track, in my opinion, when it speculates that, in conjunction with changing the definition of accredited investor, the SEC could limit the amount invested by each investor – following the 10% limit of Regulation A+, for example. That kind of limitation would be new to Rule 506 offerings.

In my Model State Crowdfunding law, I use a definition of accredited investors that includes lawyers, accountants, and anyone with the license from FINRA, as long as the lawyer, accountant, or license-holder has income of at least $75,000. Recognizing the imperfection of any definition, I think that strikes about the right balance. Bolt on an SEC-administered examination option and we’re right there with the subcommittee report.

All in all, it’s good to see the SEC, once again, thinking through the issues carefully. We can see the light at the end of the tunnel.

Questions? Let me know.